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The Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act's
Preemption Power: An Examination of the Import of
Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams
On June 6, 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that portions of the Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealer
Licensing Act, prohibiting the use of nonnegotiable arbitration agreements
in automobile franchise agreements, were preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA). This case was the latest in a series of cases
dealing with the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act's preemption power.
Because the FAA does not contain an explicit preemption provision, there
has been much confusion over the years concerning the scope of FAA
preemption power and exactly when a state law will be preempted.
This Note will attempt to provide order to the various cases
dealing with the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act's preemption power.
Part I of this Note is a discussion of the history of arbitration, leading up
to and including, the enactment of the FAA, the purposes of the FAA,
and the United States Supreme Court's and other federal courts' changing
view of arbitration as a form of dispute resolution. Part II is a detailed
discussion of the facts of the Saturn Distribution case and examine both
the majority and the dissenting opinions. Part III is an analysis of both
the majority and dissenting opinions in light of the prior case law, the
purposes behind the FAA and certain public policy considerations.
Finally, this Note will conclude that the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Saturn
Distribution was incorrectly decided in light of the Dealers' Day in Court
Act, which equalizes the economic advantages manufacturers have over
their dealers. As a result of the Act, dealers are provided with an
opportunity for judicial determination of disputes.1
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
A. The History of Arbitration
Arbitration is not a recent development. It has existed as a form
of dispute resolution almost as long as humankind itself. One of the
earliest examples of the use of arbitration as a form of dispute resolution
comes from ancient Greece and Israel where traveling wise men, for a
1. Hanley v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 433 F.2d 708 (10th Cir. 1970); Barney Motor
Sales v. Cal Sales, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 172 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
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fee, would act as ad hoc arbitrators. 2 Despite its long history as a form
of dispute resolution, arbitration faced a considerable amount of judicial
hostility from the early English and American courts. In Vynior's Case,3
Lord Coke held that agreements to arbitrate were revocable at will, prior
to the issuance of an award. Despite arguments advanced by
commentators that Vynior's Case was incorrectly decided,4 it quickly
became firmly entrenched in English and American courts. The common
law rule regarding agreements to arbitrate quickly grew to stand for the
proposition that such agreements are not enforceable because they are
viewed as an attempt to deprive the courts of their jurisdictions Thus,
prior to the adoption of the Federal Arbitration Act, courts generally
looked with disfavor on arbitration agreements, holding that public policy
forbade the specific performance of such agreements. 6
The common law rule remained unaltered by American courts until
the late 1800's. Fueled by the English decision of Scott v. Avery,7
American courts began to hold that agreements to arbitrate were
enforceable.3 The change in the American position is thought to be a
result of the increased industrialization at the turn of the century and the
increased frequency of labor and business disputes.9 The acceptance of
arbitration as an alternative form of dispute resolution took a giant step
forward in 1920 with New York's adoption of the first "modem"
arbitration statute. The statute generally permitted parties to include
binding agreements to arbitrate in their contracts. 10
2. THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 2.3, at 19 (1987).
3. 4 Eng. Rep. 302 (1609).
4. It has been argued by author Julius Cohen that the rule of Vynior's Case was
wrongly formulated and improperly emphasized by later courts.
It was wrongly formulated because, at that time, the law of binding
contracts was just emerging and because Lord Coke confused the Vynior
facts with situations where a person grants a power which is revocable by
the grantor; [it] was improperly emphasized because, first, the rule was
dictum and, second, because there were other cases, some earlier,
upholding the enforceability of arbitration.
OEHMKE, supra note 2, at 21.
5. OEHMKE, supra note 2, at 19. See also Robert Lawrence Company v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, and cert.
dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
6. Petition of Pahlberg, 43 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), appeal dismissed, In re
Pahlberg Petition, 131 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1942).
7. 5 H.L. Cas. 811 (1856) (holding that agreements to arbitrate future disputes which
were limited to specific matters, did not displace the court's jurisdiction and were valid and
enforceable as to those specific matters only).
8. Snodgrass v. Gavit, 28 Pa. 221 (1857) (holding that an agreement to arbitrate future
disputes was enforceable).
9. OEHMKE, supra note 2, at 19.
10. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7501 (1980). See OFHMKE, supra note 2, at 19.
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B. The Federal Arbitration Act
In 1925, Congress followed New York's lead and enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act." The passage of this act was an indication of a
"growing national policy favoring arbitration as an alternative form of
dispute resolution permitting parties to submit their disputes to a private
arbitrator rather than pursuing litigation, thus reducing the number of
cases tried in the courts."2 The FAA was enacted to combat the judicial
hostility faced by arbitration at common law and to reverse the common
law rules that arbitration agreements were revocable by either party at any
time prior to the issuance of an arbitration award.? In addition to
reversing the common law rules, the FAA was enacted "to ensure that
courts would honor the contractual agreements of parties who choose to
resolve their disputes by means of the informal arbitration procedure" 4
and "to make it possible for parties who agreed to arbitrate to avail
themselves of the same legal and equitable sanctions as could parties to
any other valid contract."' s Thus, under the provisions of the FAA,
arbitration agreements which come within its scope are as effectively
enforceable as any other contract provision.!6
While the purpose of the FAA has been made relatively clear by
the courts, the scope of the FAA was anything but clear until recently. In
order to effectuate fully the congressional intent behind the enactment of
the FAA, 7 the FAA must apply equally in both state and federal courts."
However, there was a substantial split of authority regarding the
applicability of the FAA in state courts:
Many early commentators concluded that the FAA was enacted by
Congress as a procedural statute applicable only in federal courts
11. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947). Previously known as the United States Arbitration Act.
12. ROBERT MELVIN RODMAN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION WITH FORMs § 3.9, at 70
(1984).
13. Id.
14. New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1988), motion denied, 489 U.S. 1007, and cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989)(citing
Mitsubishi Motors, Inc. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1985); Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985)).
15. Laura A. Kaster, Note, The Consequences of a Broad Arbitration Clause Under
The Federal Arbitration Act, 52 B.U. L. REV. 571 (1972).
16. Global Maritime Leasing Panama, Inc. v. M/S North Breeze, 349 F. Supp. 779,
784 (D.R.I. 1972). See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 419
U.S. 885 (1974).
17. See infra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
18. See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). See generally
Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law,
71 VA. L. REv. 1305 (1985).
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and that the Act, therefore, did not displace state authority in the
field of arbitration. Other commentators have concluded that the
FAA created a body of federal substantive law applicable in both
federal and state courts."9
The majority of courts addressing this issue have held that the FAA
creates a "body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to
any arbitration agreements within the coverage of the Act. "20
The FAA was conclusively classified as substantive by the United
States Supreme Court in Southland Corp. v. Keating.2 In Keating, the
Court dealt with a dispute between the Southland Corporation, the owners
and franchisors of a chain of convenience stores, and a number of their
California franchisees. The franchisees filed an action in California state
court alleging a laundry list of causes of action, including a violation of
the California Franchise Investment Law (FIL).2 Pursuant to an
arbitration clause contained in the franchise agreement,n the Southland
Corporation moved the court to compel arbitration of the matter. The state
court granted Southland's motion as to all causes of action except the
violation of the FIL. The court read the FIL as requiring a judicial forum
for resolution of disputes arising under it? 4
The United States Supreme Court held that the portion of the FIL
requiring a judicial forum was in direct conflict with Section 2 of the
FAA and was therefore void under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution s The Court stated that the FAA was enacted pursuant
19. Carlos R. Carrasquillo, Note, Commercial Arbitration: Southland Corp. v.
Keating - Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act Preempts State Law in the Field of
Commercial Arbitration, J. CORP. L., Spring 1985, at 767. See also Julius H. Cohen &
Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 275-76 (1926);
Note, Erie, Bernhardt & Section 2 of the United States Arbitration Act: A Farrago of
Rights, Remedies and a Right to a Remedy, 69 YALE L.J. 847, 863 (1960); Note, Scope of
the United States Arbitration Act in Commercial Arbitration: Problems in Federalism, 58
Nw. U. L. REv. 468, 492 (1963).
20. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983). See also El Hass Eng'g & Transport Co. v. American Indep. Oil Co., 183 F.
Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 289 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1961), and
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961); Pinkis v. Network Cinema Corp., 512 P.2d 751 (Wash.
App. 1973); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. McNeal, 239 S.E.2d 401, 403 (Ga.
App. 1977); Episcopal Hous. Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 647, 649 (S.C. 1977);
Mamlin v. Susan Thomas, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
21. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
22. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 3000-516 (West 1977).
23. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3. The arbitration clause at issue in
Keating provided: "[any controversey or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement
... shall be settled by arbitration ...."
24. Id. See generally Carrasquillo, supra note 19, at 773-74.
25. Keating, 465 U.S. 1.
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to the Commerce Clause and was a body of substantive law enforceable
in both state and federal courts.Y "In enacting [Section] 2 of the Federal
Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew
the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."'
"In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts,
Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the
enforceability of arbitration agreements."29 The Court saw nothing in the
FAA indicating that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any
additional limitations under state law.30 Thus, after Keating, it was clear
that the FAA was applicable in both state and federal courts, and the
states had no power to limit the use of arbitration agreements in
transactions falling within the scope of the FAA. "The Supreme Court's
decisions support a conclusion that all state laws seeking to limit the use
of the arbitral process are superseded by federal law. "31
Since the FAA does not have an explicit preemption provision,
courts have come to rely on Section 2 of the FAA to implement fully the
congressional intent behind the enactment of the FAA. Section 2 provides
that "a written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy . . . arising out
of such contract or transaction, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."32 "Section 2 embodies a clear federal policy
26. '"he Congress shall have power...
[3] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
27. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12. See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967); Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).
28. Keatling, 465 U.S. 1, 10.
29. Id. at 16.
30. Id. at 11.
31. Keystone Shipping, 855 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1988), motion denied, 489 U.S. 1007,
and cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
32. Section 2 of the FAA provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
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of requiring arbitration unless the agreement to arbitrate is not part of a
contract evidencing interstate commerce or is revocable 'upon such
grounds as exist at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.'
Thus, courts no longer have the power to decide matters subject to a valid
arbitration agreement where that agreement is within the scope of Section
2 of the FAA. Under the FAA, the courts have been assigned the limited
role of ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a
claim which, on its face, is governed by the agreement to arbitrate.3
C. Courts' Changing View of Arbitration
During the past two decades, the increase in the use of arbitration
in the resolution of commercial disputes, tort actions, and insurance
claims in the United States has been phenomenal s This increase has
been due to many factors, none of which is more influential than the fact
that arbitration as a form of dispute resolution is quickly gaining
acceptance among the various courts in the country. In fact, public policy
now favors the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate without regard to
the justiciability of underlying claims. It is no longer of any consequence
that a court, otherwise competent to hear a dispute, is deprived of its
jurisdiction by the arbitration process.3 A survey of relatively recent
Supreme Court and other federal court decisions clearly demonstrates a
strong national policy favoring arbitration and requiring the enforcement
of arbitration agreements. 7
There are several reasons for the courts' departure from the
common law judicial hostility towards arbitration. One of the most
apparent reasons is that the competence of arbitral tribunals is much
higher today than it has ever been.3" So many cases today deal with such
highly technical areas that the arbitral tribunal is almost better suited to
33. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 1947).
34. Benjamin Suckewer and Thomas E. Heftier, Disputes Among Shareholders and
Directors in Closely Held Corporations in ARBITRATION: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES,
INSURANCE AND TORT CLAIMs 11, 64 (Alan I. Widiss ed., 1979).
35. Alan I. Widiss, Introduction, in ARBITRATION: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES,
INSURANCE AND TORT CLAIMS I (Alan I. Widiss ed., 1979).
36. Pettinaro Constr. Co. v. Harry C. Partridge & Sons, Inc. 408 A.2d 957, 961 (Del.
Ch. 1979).
37. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1986), reh'g denied,
483 U.S. 1056 (1987); Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. 1 (1983);
Prima Paint., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Necehi S.P.A. v. Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp.,
348 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966).
38. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. MeMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34.
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resolve the dispute than is the judicial forum. 39 If the parties are forced
into pursuing their rights in a judicial forum, they may very well end up
appearing before a judge with little or no knowledge in the area from
which the dispute arose. If the parties are permitted to submit their
dispute to arbitration, they can select an arbitrator who has a substantial
degree of expertise in the applicable area, thus, in all probability,
facilitating a more just resolution.
Speed in settling a case which could have dragged through the
courts for years is another principal reason why arbitration is becoming an
increasingly popular way to resolve a dispute. In a study done in the
securities context, "the average elapsed time to the termination of a case
through litigation was 599 days, whereas the average elapsed time for
cases referred to arbitration was 434 days. "4°  The reduction in the
amount of time required to resolve a dispute through arbitration also
results in lower costs to the parties, thereby providing more people with
the opportunity to pursue their rights. Thus, it is clear that commercial
arbitration is favored as a speedy and cost efficient method of dispute
resolution.4
II. DISCUSSION OF Saturn Distribution
Corp. v. Williams
A. Facts of the Case
Saturn Distribution Corporation (Saturn) is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Saturn Corporation, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
General Motors Corporation. Saturn was created to design, manufacture,
and market motor vehicles under the "Saturn" nameplate. Saturn sets itself
apart from other manufacturers of motor vehicles by using a slightly
different "Mission and Philosophy" of manufacturing and marketing
automobiles.' This "Mission and Philosophy" is reflected in the Saturn
Distribution Corporation Dealer Agreement (Dealer Agreement). To
further implement its philosophy, Saturn concluded that an alternative
39. This is because the parties may seek out a specialist in the field to act as an
arbitrator if proceeding to arbitration, while in a judicial forum they may be assigned to a
judge with no understanding of the area.
40. See William C. Hermann, Arbitration of Securities Disputes: Rodriguez and New
Arbitration Rules Leave Investors Holding a Mixed Bag, 65 IND. LJ. 697, 707 (1990).
41. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Benson, 432 A.2d 905 (NJ. 1981).
42. Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 721 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 516, and reh'g denied, en banc, 1990, U.S. App. LEXIS 22948.
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system of dispute resolution should be a core element of its Dealer
Agreement. That system includes binding arbitration which is mandatory
under the agreement. 0
Under Saturn's Dealer Agreement, if a dispute arises, either party,
Saturn or the dealer, may file a request for mediation. The dispute is then
forwarded to a mediation panel, which recommends a consensus solution.
If either party rejects the panel's solution, the dispute then proceeds to
binding arbitration, which provides for discovery and a hearing. The
arbitration panel, composed of two Saturn representatives and two dealers,
must reach a consensus decision. This decision is final and unappealable,
except as provided by the Federal Arbitration Act." This arbitration
procedure is considered by Saturn as central to the structure of its Dealer
Agreement, and Saturn, therefore, refuses to contract with any dealer who
will not consent to the mandatory arbitration provision.4,
This case arose because of two conflicting provisions of the
Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealer Licensing Act. The first of which,4
provides:
It is unlawful for any manufacturer, factory branch,
distributor or distributor branch, or any field representative,
officer, agent or any representative whatsoever of any of them:
10. To fail to include in any franchise with a motor
vehicle dealer the following language: "If any provision
herein contravenes the valid laws or regulations of any
state or other jurisdiction wherein this agreement is to
be performed, or denies access to the procedures,
forums, or remedies provided for by such laws or
regulations, such provision shall be deemed to be
modified to conform to such laws or regulations, and
all other terms and provisions shall remain in full force
and effect," or words to that effect.47
The other provision' is primarily an enforcement provision requiring a
manufacturer to submit its standard franchise agreement to the
43. Id.
44. Id. at 721 n.1.
45. Id. It is for this reason that the Fourth Circuit's opinion refers to the arbitration
clause as "nonnegotiable."
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-550.5:27 (1989 Supp.).
47. Id.
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-550.5:24 (1988 Supp.).
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Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles for his approval prior
to offering it to the dealer."
When Saturn submitted its Dealer Agreement to the Commissioner,
David E. Williams, he rejected it on the basis of the "nonnegotiable"
arbitration clause. The Commissioner "also made it clear that he would
not approve the Agreement unless it included an 'opt-out' provision to the
binding arbitration provisions" allowing dealers to escape being forced
into arbitration s" Saturn brought this action for declaratory and injunctive
relief against the Commissioner alleging that the provisions of the Virginia
Motor Vehicle Dealer Licensing Act, as applied by the Commissioner,
were preempted by the FAA.s' The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia held that the FAA did not preempt the
Virginia provisions and granted summary judgment to the Commissioner. s2
B. The Majority Opinion
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court's granting of summary judgment and
held that Section 46.1-550.5:27 of the Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealer
Licensing Act, as applied by the Commissioner, does conflict with the
Federal Arbitration Act and is therefore preempted under the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution! Thus, the "nonnegotiable"
arbitration provision in Saturn's Dealer Agreement is enforceable in
Virginia and the Commissioner may not prohibit or discourage the use of
"nonnegotiable" arbitration provisions in contracts between Saturn and its
dealers in Virginia. s'
The first step in the Fourth Circuit's reasoning was to determine if
the scope of the FAA encompasses state laws governing the formation of
arbitration agreements. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that pursuant to
Section 2 of the FAA, arbitration agreements must be placed on the same
enforceability level as other contracts. "The language of the FAA requires
that states place no greater restrictions upon arbitration provisions than
they place upon other contractual terms. "ss Therefore, if a state law
singles out arbitration agreements and limits or restricts their
49. Saturn Distribution, 905 F.2d 719, 721.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 717 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Va. 1989).
53. U.S. CONST., art. VI.
54. Saturn Distribution, 905 F.2d 719, 722.
55. Id.
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enforceability, it will be preempted.5 ' The majority relied on a number of
cases expressing the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration and the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate."
The majority next considered whether the Virginia statutes at issue
were preempted by the FAA. The majority closely examined the wording
of the Virginia provision at issue,5 ' and determined that while the Virginia
statute appeared to void all arbitration agreements in automobile franchise
agreements, the Commissioner's interpretation that only nonnegotiable
arbitration agreements are prohibited by this section would be considered
controlling.' The majority stated that since the general common and
statutory law of Virginia enabled contracting parties to make the terms of
their contract nonnegotiable, the Virginia provision in question
unjustifiably singled out arbitration agreements and therefore was
preempted.60 The majority found the reasoning in Securities Industry
Ass'n v. Connolly6' persuasive. Connolly held that Massachusetts
regulations prohibiting securities brokerage firms from including
nonnegotiable arbitration provisions in their customer agreements were
preempted by the FAA. 62
Finally, the majority refused to adopt the position of the district
court that the Virginia statute could be harmonized with the FAA because
it only ensures "consensual rather than forced arbitration. "6 The majority
argued that the district court's reliance on statements made during the
legislative hearings, to the effect that the Act would not apply to
standardized contracts, was misplaced. The majority felt that these
statements "should not be overemphasized due to the absence of limiting
language in the FAA and the fact that the Act has often been applied to
standardized contracts."6 The majority further declined to accept that the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Volt Information Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University," mandated a
contrary result. In Volt, the Court stated that "[a]rbitration under the Act
56. Id.
57. See Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-550.5:27 (1988 Supp.).
59. Saturn Distribution, 905 F.2d 719, 724.
60. Id.
61. 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
62. Saturn Distribution, 905 F.2d 719, 724.
63. Id. at 726.
64. Id. at 726 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477, 478 (1989)); Perry, 482 U.S.
483, 485; Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614, 617.
65. 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989).
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is a matter of consent, not coercion."" The Fourth Circuit argued that
the Supreme Court's statement in Volt required that the FAA not impose
arbitration on unwilling parties, but allowed the parties to agree to submit
their disputes to arbitration.0 Thus, since the dealers were not required to
agree to the terms of the Dealer Agreement," the arbitration involved in
this case was still a matter of consent and not one of coercion.
C. The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Widener presented a
relatively compelling argument challenging the majority's reasoning. He
argued that the majority abandoned the proper and appropriate preemption
analysis and failed to take into consideration Virginia's inherent right to
protect its own citizens.6 9  The dissent contended that the majority
employed the "frustrate the federal policy" theory of preemption70 which is
the most difficult preemption theory to establish.!' Judge Widener argued
that this category of preemption is "in the face of congressional silence"
and therefore the analysis must start with a "presumption against
preemption."72 Thus, Widener argued that since "statutes that regulate the
relationship between dealers and manufacturers in an attempt to equalize
the parties' respective bargaining power are a legitimate exercise of a
state's police powers, "73 the analysis must "'start with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.'" 4 Thus, according to Widener, the appropriate starting point
for analyzing the Virginia statute is the presumption against preemption,
absent a clear and manifest congressional intent to the contrary. 75
66. Id. at 475.
67. Saturn Distribution, 905 F.2d 719, 727.
68. Id. The majority argued that becoming a Saturn dealer was a matter of choice and
if the dealer strongly objected to the terms of the Saturn Dealer Agreement, it could choose
not to become a dealer and thus not have to agree to the arbitration provisions.
69. Saturn Distribution, 905 F.2d 719, 727 (Widener, J., dissenting).
70. This theory essentially states that a state statute is preempted when compliance with
it would frustrate the policy behind a federal statute.
71. Saturn Distribution, 905 F.2d 719, 728 (Widener, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (quoting Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988)).
73. Id. (quoting Boatland, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 558 F.2d 818, 823 (6th Cir.
1977)).
74. Id. at 728 (quoting California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989)
quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
75. Id. at 728.
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Widener then applied this analysis to the Virginia statute and
argued that it requires a different result than that reached by the majority.
Since the FAA contains no explicit preemptive provision and does not
reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration,76 in
order to support a finding of preemption, the majority must find that the
Virginia statute is in direct conflict with the FAA. 7 Widener argued that
there is no direct conflict and that because there is no conflict, the
analysis should end there and the Virginia provisions should be
enforceable.
However, Widener did not end his dissent there. He went on to
argue that the majority failed to recognize the significance of the Dealers'
Day in Court Act (DDCA).7' The ultimate purpose of the DDCA is to
curtail the effects of any coercion and intimidation which automobile
manufacturers may be able to impose on their retail dealers by virtue of
the manufacturers' superior economic position.79  The DDCA, Widener
claimed, shows a clear congressional intent to override the FAA in this
area by indicating its intent to preclude waiver of a judicial forum.rs By
essentially ignoring the DDCA, the majority had overlooked the reasons
behind the enactment of that statute which, Widener argued, are
essentially the same reasons behind the Virginia statute at issue.81 Thus,
Widener concluded that where a "presumptively valid state statute is in
general tension with a federal statute of general application, and yet
furthers precisely the same goals as another federal statute dealing
precisely with the specific subject in issue, the state enactment should
stand until Congress says otherwise." s2 Thus, in light of the purpose
behind the DDCA, Widener argued that the Virginia provisions should
stand until Congress specifically addresses this issue.
Finally, Widener found Securities Industry Ass'n v. Connolly,U
unpersuasive for two reasons. First, Widener argued, the "underlying
76. Id. (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 471 (1989)).
77. Id. at 728.
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1982).
79. De Cantis v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distributors, Inc., 371 F. Supp 123 (E.D. Va.
1974).
80. Saturn Distribution, 905 F.2d 719, 729 (Widener, J., dissenting). Widener relies
on a portion of the legislative history of the DDCA which states: "The bill creates a cause
of action where none previously existed in that, irrespective of contractual provisions, it
grants a right of review in the Federal courts between automobile manufacturers and their
dealers . . . ." H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1956
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4596.
81. Saturn Distribution, 905 F.2d 719, 729 (Widener, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 730.
83. 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989).
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reasoning of Connolly is its concern with [the] '[i]ncreased resort to the
courts, and the consequent tumefaction of already-swollen court
calendars.'"" Widener did not believe that this concern should enter into
the court's decision because the court's job is to do justice between the
parties, and not to keep their dockets clear." Second, Widener argued
that Connolly is a securities case, and securities regulation is an area
where the Supreme Court has addressed the applicability of the FAA."
Another distinguishing point is that the regulations at issue in Connolly
arose from the states' concurrent power to regulate the area of securities,
while the Virginia statute arises from Virginia's inherent police power to
protect its citizens." Widener concluded by stating that "[bly precluding
Saturn from making arbitration clauses nonnegotiable, Virginia is merely
seeking to ensure that arbitration 'is a matter of consent, not
coercion ....
III. ANALYSIS
A. Intended Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act
The majority's conclusion that the arbitration agreement contained
in Saturn's Dealer Agreement was within the intended scope of the
Federal Arbitration Act was definitely in accord with the prior case law
dealing with the scope of the FAA and the legislative history of the FAA.
From the language of the FAA itself, it is apparent that the FAA applies
to maritime transactions and any contract evidencing interstate
commerce. 9  As stated previously, the FAA enunciates a clear
"congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to
the contrary. "' Furthermore, the FAA was enacted to promote the
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate and to make arbitration a more
84. Id. at 1116.
85. Saturn Distribution, 905 F.2d 719, 731 (Widener, J. dissenting) (quoting Connolly,
883 F.2d 1114, 1116 (1st Cir. 1989)).
86. Id. at 730 (citing Rodriguez de Quyjas, 490 U.S. 477 (1989), Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 482 U.S. 220 (1986)).
87. 905 F.2d 719, 730 (4th Cir. 1990). Here, Virginia is trying to protect its
automobile dealers from the disparity of bargaining power between the dealers and auto
manufacturers.
88. Id. at 730 (Widener, J., dissenting), (quoting Volt Info. Science, 489 U.S. 468, 471
(1989)),
89. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947).
90. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
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viable option to parties who would have trouble affording the costs and
delays of ordinary litigation.9'
The Saturn Dealer Agreement was clearly one involving interstate
commerce and thus is covered by the FAA. However, the Commissioner
argued that the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act's preemption power
is limited to laws covering existing arbitration agreements and does not
extend to laws that prohibit or regulate the formation of arbitration
agreements. 92 The majority properly disagrees with this proposition. The
mere fact that the majority of cases dealing with the scope of the FAA
have arisen in the context of existing arbitration agreements does not, by
any means, limit the Federal Arbitration Act's preemption power to
existing agreements. By enacting the FAA, "Congress intended to
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements."' The majority correctly stated that if it were to
restrict the Federal Arbitration Act's preemption power to existing
arbitration agreements it would, in effect, allow the states to "wholly
eviscerate congressional intent to place arbitration agreements 'upon the
same footing as other contracts.'"94
A diligent search has failed to produce a single case which adopts
the narrow interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act's preemption
power advanced by the Commissioner. However, as the majority stated,
the Commissioner's interpretation was rejected by the First Circuit in
Securities Industry Ass'n v. Connolly."s Despite the arguments expressed
by Judge Widener in his dissent that Connolly is unpersuasive in this case,
Connolly appears to be applicable here. Connolly dealt with state
regulations concerning predispute arbitration agreements. Specifically, the
regulations barred firms from requiring, as a nonnegotiable condition
precedent to account relationships, that customers agree to predispute
arbitration agreements; they required that the arbitration agreement be
brought "conspicuously" to the attention of prospective customers, and
they required the brokers to make written disclosure of the effect of the
agreement.9' One of the main reasons behind the First Circuit's decision
that the regulations were preempted by the FAA was that the regulations
singled out arbitration agreements, thus they conflicted with the federal
91. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985); H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2(1924).
92. Saturn Distribution, 905 F.2d 719, 723.
93. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16.
94. Saturn Distribution, 905 F.2d 719, 723 (quoting Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16-17
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)).
95. 883 F.2d 1114, 1123-24 (Ist Cir. 1989).
96. Id. at 1117.
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policy of placing arbitration agreements on equal footing with other
contracts.97 "A state law principle that takes its meaning precisely from
the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [the
equality] requirement of [Section 2].""s Applying this principle to the
Virginia statute at issue dictates that it too, must be preempted. Even
though the Virginia statute does not explicitly mention arbitration
agreements, its effect is to undercut the enforceability of such agreements
and it is therefore in direct conflict with the "congressional intent to
foreclose all state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements."99
B. Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act's Preemptive Power to
the Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealer Licensing Act
While the thrust of the majority's opinion appears to be based on
the need to further the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration through
the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate and the preemption of state
laws hindering such agreements, the majority's lack of discussion of the
effect of the Dealers' Day in Court Act (DDCA)W is somewhat
troublesome. The majority dealt with the DDCA briefly in a footnoteo' by
stating that the text of the DDCA does not demonstrate a clear
congressional intent to override the FAA, and that it was not deciding
whether all DDCA claims could be arbitrated.102 The majority
rationalized its refusal to deal with the DDCA issue by referring to
another Fourth Circuit case which stated, "[clourts cannot determine
whether arbitration agreements are to be enforced by making subjective
judgments as to the relative importance of various federal statutes."103
The majority stated that clear guidance from Congress was required
before federal courts should refrain from enforcing arbitration
agreements.104
While the majority does have a point that clear guidance is
required from Congress on this issue, the legislative history of the DDCA
97. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 470 U.S. 213, 219 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1924)). See also Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).
98. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1123 (quoting Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9).
99. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16.
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25.
101. Saturn Distribution, 905 F.2d 719, 722 n.2.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 203 (4th Cir.
1990), reh'g denied en banc, No. 88-1796, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 7370 (4th Cir. Mar. 28,
1990), and cert. granted in part, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990), and aft'd, 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991)).
104. Id.
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seems to indicate the required congressional intent needed to override the
FAA. "An exception to federal preemption exists if Congress has
overridden the FAA by indicating its intent to preclude waiver of a
judicial forum for a particular statutory right.""' As Judge Widener
argued in his dissent, "[a] congressional intent to preclude waiver of a
judicial forum for a particular statutory right 'will be deducible from text
or legislative history.'"' 6  The legislative history of the DDCA states:
"The bill creates a cause of action where none previously existed in that,
irrespective of contractual provisions, it grants a right of review in the
federal courts of disputes between automobile manufacturers and their
dealers . . . ."7 The legislative history also states that Section 2 of the
DDCA:s°
authorizes a franchised dealer to bring suit against the
manufacturer in an appropriate United States district court,
without respect to the amount in controversy, to recover damages
by reason of the manufacturer's failure ... to act in good faith in
the performance of the franchise or in terminating, canceling or
not renewing the franchise.'"
This language, written some thirty years after the enactment of the
FAA," ° does seem to indicate Congress' intent to override the FAA with
regard to disputes between automobile manufacturers and their dealers.
Furthermore, one of the purposes behind the DDCA is to assure a
dealer an opportunity to secure a judicial determination, irrespective of
contractual terms, as to whether the automobile manufacturer has failed to
act in good faith in performing or complying with any provisions of the
franchise agreement."' Thus, from the use of the phrase "irrespective of
contractual provisions" (or "terms") in both the legislative history of the
DDCA and the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the statute in Marquis v.
Chrysler Corp., it seems apparent that Congress intended a dealer to have
an opportunity to seek a judicial determination of any conflicts arising
between the dealer and the manufacturer, despite any contractual provision
denying the dealer this opportunity.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 729 (Widener, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985)) (emphasis added).
107. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1956
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4596).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1222.
109. H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 3 U.S. CODE & ADMIN.
NEws 4596, 4602 (1956).
110. This language was written in 1956. The FAA was enacted in 1925.
111. Marquis v. Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 7:1 1991]
SCOPE OF FAA's PREEMPTION POWER
Another purpose behind the DDCA is "to remedy the manifest
disparity in the ability of the franchised dealers of automotive vehicles to
bargain with their manufacturers.""2 "A primary source of the
manufacturer's power over their dealers stems from the unilateral nature
of the franchise agreements.""3 The nonnegotiable nature of the
arbitration clause in Saturn's dealer agreement operates in direct conflict
with the purposes behind the DDCA. Moreover, Saturn's refusal to
negotiate with regard to the arbitration clause is an example of the type of
disparity in bargaining power and coercion employed by manufacturers
against dealers at which the DDCA was aimed. In order to become a
Saturn dealer, a person must fully consent to the binding arbitration
clause, thereby foregoing his opportunity and right to secure a judicial
determination of any later arising conflict between himself and the
manufacturer. This result is contrary to the purposes and rationales behind
the DDCA.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the majority's opinion seems to be in accord with the
majority of cases dealing with the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act's
preemption power, the majority appears to have erred in failing to
examine fully the effect of the Dealers' Day in Court Act on the issue in
front of it. The majority's decision would, in essence, be correct if the
same issue arose out of a different factual setting. However, because
Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams involved a dispute over a proposed
arbitration agreement between an automobile manufacturer and prospective
dealers, the majority should have considered the impact of the DDCA. If
the majority would have done so, it would have held that the Virginia
statute was not preempted because Congress, through the DDCA,
expressed its intent to override the FAA with regard to disputes between
automobile manufacturers and their dealers.
The only ways this issue can be finally resolved are for the
Supreme Court to address it or for Congress to provide some guidance
and clearly indicate its intent on this issue. Thus, at the very least, the
112. H.R. REP. No. 2850, supra note 109, at 4596-97.
113. Id. at 4599.
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majority's decision in this case strengthens the cries for congressional
guidance on this issue.
John C. Norling
